研讨主题
Information and Learning in Markets —— The Impact of Market Microstructure
主讲人
吕嘉琪（中经管2022级硕士生）
论文摘要
We will explore the welfare of the large Cournot market under asymmetric information and use a linear-quadratic-normal example to illustrate that only in fairly specific game structures does the large market aggregate information. Next we examine information aggregation properties of auction and voting mechanisms. Finally, we will examine the implications of costly information acquisition for information aggregation in the context of the Cournot market and give a concluding remark on this topic.
时间
4月23日 (晚上6：00-8：00）
地点
学术会堂712
主持老师
张志祥、尹训东、史博文
活动对象
304am永利集团官网员工
人数规模
30人
主办单位
304am永利集团官网
